When John F. Kennedy became President, many states were struggling with K–12 student performance, but the full extent of the problem was unknown—there was no national yardstick.

Six years after Kennedy’s death, an extraordinary national measurement tool was introduced: the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).

Sixteen years after Kennedy’s death, Congress created the U.S. Department of Education—referred to here as the DOE. However, its founding legislation did not establish transforming nationwide K–12 student performance as a paramount mission for the Department. Instead, the Department was established largely to consolidate and administer federal education programs, functions, and responsibilities—transforming nationwide K–12 student performance was not identified as a specific mission.

National media and social media regularly remind Americans—and audiences throughout the industrialized world—of U.S. K–12 student performance, as measured by NAEP. Congress has attempted to address the problem through legislation such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA)—both relying heavily on traditional administrative approaches—but neither has delivered the transformative nationwide results needed. Nonetheless, at its fingertips, Congress has the U.S. Department of Education.

Regarding the DOE, Congress faces three choices: do nothing, abolish it, or enact straightforward, strategic changes to its governing legislation. See below, “Legislate a Panel,” and the accompanying suggestions for Congress.

Regarding K–12 student performance, the default option is to leave the DOE as it is, rely on the states to do the best they can, and wait for a future Congress to rewrite the Department’s governing legislation. However, the downside is that during this waiting period, roughly half of the nation’s students may continue to complete high school without demonstrating NAEP Proficient-level performance in reading or mathematics.

The consequence is profound. The underdevelopment of human potential on this scale—potentially extending well beyond the share of students identified by NAEP performance statistics—weakens every sector of the nation, including the skilled trades, higher education, and large-scale industrial production, particularly advanced mega-factories.

An aside: Be cautious of the assumption that higher-performing NAEP states have discovered the secret to educational success. While they outperform lower-performing states, some may benefit from demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural advantages. (Next title: The elephant in the room.)

Some states consistently outperform others in K–12 education. While state leaders may credit their policies, the reality may be that high-performing states reflect populations with a disproportionately stronger cultural emphasis on education.

After all, low-performing schools may persist even within high-performing states—and low-performing states may still contain high-performing schools.

For U.S. student performance to become globally competitive, every high-performing K–12 school must achieve substantially better results than it does today—and every low-performing school must improve rapidly until its outcomes begin to overlap, and increasingly overlap, with those of higher-performing schools.

A temporary phenomenon that at first appears permanent

Traditionally lower-performing K–12 states have at times shown improved performance as students and teachers respond to the heightened attention surrounding a newly introduced initiative—regardless of the initiative itself. For example, a highly publicized effort accompanied by sustained media attention could temporarily increase engagement even if the underlying intervention is relatively modest.

The Hawthorne effect is the term commonly used to describe this phenomenon. The concept originated from studies conducted during the 1920s and 1930s at Hawthorne Works, a factory operated by Western Electric near Chicago, in which worker output appeared to increase in response to heightened observation and attention directed toward employees and their work environment. Once the added attention diminished, output often returned toward prior levels.

The implication for K–12 education is that gains following a new initiative may not necessarily represent lasting structural improvement. Accordingly, there must be ongoing hard-number testing and performance assessment.

For any complex system to excel, there must be a dedicated central hub, indispensable for sharing strategy, monitoring performance, and sharing a common direction and accountability.

Kennedy’s death came before he could formally request the establishment of a non-intrusive, central federal hub with the mission to monitor and independently help shape K–12 student performance within the states.

Sixteen years after Kennedy’s assassination, Congress established the U.S. Department of Education—putatively a central management hub for education-related matters. However, it largely mirrored the structure of the Office of Education it replaced.

Unfortunately, as had been true of the Office of Education, Kennedy’s overarching concern—K–12 student performance—was not explicitly addressed in the mandate of the newly created U.S. Department of Education. Arguably, this omission has contributed to the effective forfeiture of the potential of millions of K–12 students who graduate each year below NAEP proficiency.

Instead—despite the high-stakes nature of U.S. K–12 student performance—the newly established DOE’s founding legislation made the Department a catch-all for assorted education programs. Although important in their own right, those programs became distractions from a singular mission: elevating nationwide K–12 student-performance results.

Compounding the issue, the position of Secretary of Education—potentially the nation’s most critical federal position for elevating K–12 student performance—was left to presidential appointment, subject to Senate confirmation.

Alternatively, Congress could consider establishing an independent Panel responsible for selecting, continuously monitoring, and evaluating Secretaries of Education based on their effectiveness in transforming nationwide K–12 student performance, subject to applicable constitutional requirements.

(See the subtopic “The Panel—and Its selection of Secretaries of Education” below.)

Focus on innovation.

Legislate that focus.

Rather than abolish or end the DOE, modify its legislation to transform it into an unparalleled national asset for U.S. K–12 student performance.

How? 

• Congress could establish the radical improvement of K–12 student performance as the DOE’s express mission—defined as achieving a continuous series of unprecedented, cumulative, and measurable multipoint gains in student outcomes nationwide, verified through hard-number metrics that include, but are not limited to, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and the individual-student capitalization rate (cap rate).
• Congress could direct the DOE to perform no functions unrelated to its express K–12 student-performance mission, thereby reducing potential distractions. Other federal education programs could be returned to their original agencies, where applicable, or reassigned to other appropriate agencies, while state-level administrative responsibilities could be redirected to the states.
• Congress could codify this organizational realignment rather than rely solely on administrative actions that could later be reversed. As noted by Education Week, “More than 100 programs run by the U.S. Department of Education are shifting to other agencies.”
• Alternatively, Congress could create a fully separate DOE division dedicated exclusively to K–12 student performance rather than transferring the Department’s other functions elsewhere. However, this approach would carry the long-term risk of mission creep and the gradual commingling of functions.

A simple but vital cornerstone of a restructured DOE that Congress could establish through legislation: radical accountability for the U.S. Secretary of Education.

Moreover, as a further step, Congress could establish an independent “Panel” (discussed below) to select, evaluate, replace, and potentially reappoint Secretaries of Education, subject to applicable constitutional requirements.

• The Panel. Congress may wish to legislate an independent Panel to select Secretaries of Education—and monitor their progress in transforming K-12 student performance.
• This explainer site proposes an independent panel with no guidelines—just the opportunity to select exceptional Secretaries of Education. Exceptional would be hard-number metrics results acceptable to the Panel and evident action by the Secretaries that generates striking nationwide K-12 student performance results—all in the opinion of the Panel (and ultimately in the opinion of Congress, which selects the Panel members).
• Backgrounds of Panel members and Secretaries. Potential Panel members could come from many backgrounds, with no required discipline, credential, or traditional career path required or preferred. Likewise—perhaps even less intuitively—potential Secretaries of Education could come from a wide range of backgrounds, only one of which might be education.
• The Panel’s understanding. U.S. Secretaries of Education have the potential to transform nationwide K–12 student performance. The Panel’s selection of Secretaries may therefore be fundamental to the nation’s K-12 student performance.

• Self-starters. Further, the Panel should recognize that effective Secretaries of Education may need to be highly competitive, high-performing self-starters—perhaps exemplified by the CEOs discussed below—not individuals who depend on someone else’s guidelines or expect Congress to provide a roadmap. After all, the absence of a roadmap for transforming nationwide K–12 student performance is precisely the issue. Rather, paramount is the flexibiltiy of a Secretary’s judgement—and the expectation that such judgement be exercised in pursuing innovaiton. 

• This explainer site encapsulates the nationwide K-12 student performance challenge and suggest that Congress consider (1) revisiting and rewriting the DOE’s governing legislation, and (2) make innovation indispensable to its mission, beginning with consideration of testing the innovation addressed in this explainer site, the free-access HSe4Metrics platform.
• A Panel fundamental. Continuous review. As a condition of Secretaries accepting the position, they would agree to replacement by the Panel at any time, including for reasons unrelated to performance, such as a change in pursuing an innovation or strategic direction.  Even a successful Secretary could be replaced if the Panel determines that a different individual would provide some benefit in the nation’s ever-evolving K-12 student performance environment.
• Panel accountability. The Panel would be accountable to Congress. Panel members would be subject to replacement without cause—and thanked by the nation for their service.
• Not passive. The Panel and each of its members would be proactive, engaged, and expected to act decisively.
• Selection of Panel members themselves. The Panel should be performance-driven, and relentlessly resourceful and innovative. Its members may be exceptional leaders of proven success from almost any professional background.
• Candidates abound. For example, in the 34.04 issue of Wired, the article “ARM’S RACE” by Lauren Goode profiles Rene Haas, CEO of Arm. Arm is a global technology leader whose chip architectures are licensed by companies including Apple, Tesla, NVIDIA, Microsoft, Amazon, Samsung, and Qualcomm. The point is not whether Mr. Haas would have any interest in serving on the Panel. Rather, exceptional potential candidates abound. Each might contribute a unique perspective shaped by experience with innovation, organizational culture, leadership, and relentless pursuit of performance.
• Another example of transformational leadership that might benefit the Panel. In the commercial sector again, consider Lou Gerstner’s turnaround of IBM. Gerstner came from Nabisco—a company known for cookies, crackers, and snacks—not technology. Despite having no computer industry background, IBM recruited him to lead the company. He quickly assessed IBM’s circumstances, halted its planned breakup, and led one of the most recognized corporate turnarounds in modern business history.
• The Gerstner example illustrates an important principle: Exceptional leadership need not come from within the industry or institution being transformed.

RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO PILE RULES AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE PANEL OR THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

The panel must not feel constrained about whether its thinking is conventional or traditional or meets hypothetical rule XYZ. Moreover, it must have the responsible freedom and unburdened focus to retain Secretaries who successfully adopt innovation, implement it, and ramp up nationwide K-12 student performance.

In practice, Congress could consult with the Panel on any issues, both by the House of Representatives and the Senate—by the House Committee of Education and Workforce and by the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

Congress would have the opportunity to codify a culture of innovation in the DOE’s governing legislation.

With a nod to two presidents, the proposed solution is so simple—and potentially so noncontroversial—that it is almost boring: Congress could re-legislate the Department of Education into an entity President Kennedy might have embraced and that President Trump likewise might find logical—by giving the agency an overriding—perhaps singular—focus on K–12 student performance, while making separate administrative arrangements for all other education-related programs, which remain important in their own right.

Both major political parties profess support for national K–12 success. For bipartisan agreement to emerge, each party would need to be satisfied that the legislation respects its fundamental priorities and does not unnecessarily threaten existing responsibilities or programs. By working together, today’s Members of Congress could pursue what previous Congresses have not: re-legislate the U.S. Department of Education with an unprecedented K–12 student performance focus.

Alternatively, the DOE could be left in place as currently legislated. U.S. Presidents could then use executive orders to implement short-term initiatives. However, governing by executive order carries inherent instability, with policy reversals that may ultimately come at the expense of sustained nationwide K–12 student performance improvement.

John F. Kennedy (president from 1961 until his assassination on November 22, 1963) advocated fairness in K–12 educational opportunity—arguably a driving objective of his education agenda, together with high levels of student performance. (Many of his proposals, however, encountered opposition or delays in Congress.)

65 years from his inauguration until today:

No national priority focus on K–12 student performance. When John F. Kennedy took office—and despite his efforts throughout his presidency—the United States lacked both a serious central management hub for K–12 student performance (only the Office of Education existed) and any national standard for K–12 education. Although some states maintained their own benchmarks, those standards varied widely, leaving the nation without a unified framework for measuring K–12 student achievement.

Then came the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Six years after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, NAEP, in 1969, was first administered nationwide to provide a consistent benchmark of student performance across all 50 states.

NAEP results confirmed widespread K–12 failure nationwide. Viewed collectively across the states, a significant portion of U.S. human capital was being lost, with students graduating from K–12 unable to read or do math at minimum proficiency.

The reason is structural. The U.S. Department of Education was not established with a focus on K–12 student performance.

Sixteen years after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy—and thus without his voice—Congress enacted the Department of Education Organization Act.

Jimmy Carter (in office from 1977 to 1981) signed the Act into law on October 17, 1979. This legislation formally established the U.S. Department of Education as the nation’s central coordination hub for education.

However, the legislation did not establish transforming nationwide K–12 student performance as a top-priority federal mission. To be clear, despite the urgency of nationwide K–12 student performance emphasized in this explainer site, the Carter-signed legislation did not list transformative nationwide K–12 student-performance gains as a U.S. Department of Education objective. Instead, the newly created Department was structured largely to consolidate and administer federal education programs.

Remarkably, this flawed 1979 DOE structure has remained in place for decades, despite NAEP alarms.

Ronald Reagan (president from 1981 to 1989) campaigned on eliminating the U.S. Department of Education. Upon taking office, he attempted to terminate it; Congress rejected the effort.

George W. Bush (president from 2001 to 2009) did not articulate a clear position on the U.S. Department of Education or its founding legislation. However, on January 8, 2002, he signed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) into law—ushering in a disruptive period for K–12 education that yielded no sustained improvement in NAEP results and resulted in a lost decade for many students.

Barack Obama (president from 2009 to 2017)—like President George W. Bush—did not advance a fundamental restructuring of the U.S. Department of Education around nationwide K–12 student performance. However, on December 10, 2015, he signed the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) into law, replacing the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) framework.

ESSA, like NCLB, was followed by a decade of persistently weak nationwide K–12 student performance, as measured by NAEP—continuing the longstanding problem that had persisted under President George W. Bush during NCLB. Under ESSA, the NAEP status quo, repeatedly highlighted by the media, has continued through the Obama, first Trump, Biden, and second Trump administrations. Throughout the ESSA years—with the Act still the law of the land today—tens of millions of students have continued to struggle in the K–12 education pipeline.

Donald J. Trump, reflecting longstanding concerns about the effectiveness of federal education policy, has criticized the United States Department of Education—regardless of the major political party in power—for presiding over persistently poor NAEP K–12 student performance outcomes, leading him to advocate eliminating the Department.

Thus, the question is

If Congress were to pass legislation retaining the DOE but rewriting its governing legislation along the lines suggested in this explainer site, might President Kennedy have signed such a bill?

And would President Trump sign it?